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A stochastic frontier model is used to explain the performance evaluation of U.S. university
extension providers by organic producers.  The model makes explicit the nonmanagerial factors
that influence both performance ratings and performance efficiency, defined as achieving a rating
as close to the “best” rating as possible.  Results indicate that extension agents are performing at
relatively high mean efficiency of 0.92, but that the average rating is relatively low at 2.66 on a
four-point scale.  Several sources of potential bias in ratings are identified as a way for managers
to more accurately conduct individual performance assessments.  Programmatic changes to
emphasize more collaborative research and training are suggested by the positive effects on
performance efficiency associated with farmer research commitment and production problem
severity. 
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Benchmarking Organizational Performance of University Extension:  
A Stochastic Frontier Approach 
The role of performance evaluation in accountability for public sector services
such as extension has been recognized by both land grant institutions and the federal
government.  In its report on the Colleges of Agriculture at the Land Grant Universities,
the National Research Council (NRC) explicitly acknowledged that these universities
face increasing pressure from the public to develop clear goals and measurable
performance standards.  The Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA) of 1993
requires every federal agency, including the research, education, and extension programs
of the USDA, to have performance goals and measures for its programs.  The Agricultural
Research, Extension, and Education Reform Act (AREERA) of 1998 requires that
Extension systems report state-level outcomes for funding decision purposes.  Decision
makers expect to see data and analysis on program results, impacts, and social and
economic consequences of federally funded programs. 
While necessary for making improvements, performance evaluation of service
providers is difficult and time consuming.  A review of the literature by Prendergast
highlighted a gap in performance assessment for jobs such as public sector employment at 
universities where output is difficult to measure.  Dixit noted that limited empirical
analysis relates performance success in public sector agencies to specific observable
characteristics of agencies, organizations, or service clients.  Smith and Goddard critiqued
performance assessments that fail to account for the full range of contingent factors that
affect the measurements recorded.  They argued that performance data are worthless2
unless subjected to analytic techniques that attempt to explain why a particular indicator
of performance is observed.  
Traditionally, extension evaluations have consisted of input measures - the
number of programs offered, participants reached, hours worked, and dollars spent. 
Radhakrishna and Martin pointed out that input-based assessments are no longer adequate
to assess program effectiveness.  Even where extensionists conduct pre- and post-meeting
satisfaction and learning surveys, the results are strictly applicable to the content and
presentations of the particular meeting, and do not enable analysts to predict the success
or failure of future programs.  To address the assessment gap and permit strategic
program development, the factors that influence stakeholder ratings of the extension
service should be benchmarked.  Understanding the sources of variation in ratings that are
not attributable to managerial performance is necessary to make appropriate adjustments
in programming (Smith and Goddard).
Our study develops a frontier model of extension performance based on
evaluations provided by farmers.  Our goal is to benchmark the nonmanagerial factors
that influence external performance ratings and performance efficiency of university
extension.  Performance efficiency is the effectiveness of extension providers in
achieving the maximum evaluations from their clientele conditioned on the characteristics
and operational environment of the producers who are rating the service.  We specify a
stochastic frontier model to identify the significant factors that influence performance
ratings and performance efficiency of extension agents. 3
 By linking performance efficiency  to observable characteristics of the farmer
evaluators and their operations, policy makers may avoid incorrect interpretation of
ratings associated with failure to account for the range of potential influences on the
measurement (Smith and Goddard).  Identifying the contingent factors that divide agents
into leaders and laggards in terms of ratings permits more accurate assessment and
managerial response. 
We apply our model using data the Organic Farming Research Foundation’s
(OFRF) 1997 nationwide survey of U.S. organic producers.  This group is an excellent
test case for several reasons.  First, the OFRF survey asked detailed questions about farm
conditions and constraints, usefulness of and frequency of contact with a variety of
information sources including extension, giving us a rich data set for the frontier analysis. 
Second, organic producers represent a relatively new clientele for extension, and
ratings may reflect the difficulty of questions relative to extension agents’ preparation,
consistent with basic personnel economics (Lazear, 1998).  Performance evaluation has
little value if service providers are all expected to perform well or the probability of a
successful outcome is high.  Farmers’ questions about organic production may require
agents to synthesize ecological and agronomic information from diverse sources into a
systems-oriented response that accounts for the legal restrictions on organic production,
an approach not typically part of agent training.   This suggests that difficult technical
questions will lead to lower performance evaluation of extension agents by organic4
farmers, representing a potential source of bias.  The stochastic frontier model allows us
to test this contention.  
Finally, there is a perception among organic farmers that university  extension is a
barrier to production.   “Uncooperative or uninformed extension agents” was rated as a
“serious constraint” by 24% of 1,126 respondents to a question eliciting constraints in the
OFRF survey (Walz).  The stochastic frontier model enables us to determine whether
farmer-evaluator characteristics affect the ratings assigned to extension by organic
farmers, and hence whether extension is being fairly assessed.
Modeling Outcomes from Performance Evaluations 
Lazear (1998) noted that performance evaluations are designed to provide two
kinds of information.  First, the service provider’s general ability is revealed in the
evaluation.  Ability predicts the employee’s long-term, stable performance and
corresponds to the frontier of “best performance” that an employee can achieve.  By
evaluating a worker’s general ability the hiring organization can assess how much
training or human capital investment to provide the employee. 
Second, the evaluation elicits information about the individual talents or skills that
the worker possesses.  By identifying the skills of each employee, the organization can
match employees to specific types of tasks or job assignments.  The employee’s skill set
influences the ability to deal with uncertainty and shifting environmental conditions
which the worker cannot control.  This element corresponds to the factors that are linked5
to inefficiency or performance less than the employee’s best possible achievement level. 
Both elements are readily identified from a stochastic frontier model. 
We adapt a public sector educational production function to model performance
evaluation, focusing on agricultural extension agents who provide technical assistance to
organic producers.  The output of our performance evaluation model is the advisor rating
by the farmer-evaluator.  The input measures in this model reflect the characteristics and
experience of the customers who use the service along with the types of problems for
which the customers seek assistance.  This makes explicit the transformation of inputs to
outputs that is commonly lacking in economic performance measurement models (Smith
and Goddard), and allows us to identify sources of variation in ratings.
The set of performance ratings y that can be attained given the input vector x and
the exogenous technical or market conditions r facing the institution providing the service
by the frontier f(x, r; $, () where $ and ( represent the set of parameters to be estimated. 
The stochastic performance frontier model incorporates a composite error term consisting
of two random variables where h(,) = (< - u).  The first element reflects temporary or
random shocks outside the control of the service providers that affect performance
ratings.  This symmetric noise error term is represented as <.  The asymmetric
inefficiency error term, u, accounts for inefficiency in providing service along with
environmental factors that reduce ratings and assumes only nonnegative values.  Shocks
that cannot be controlled by the extension service provider include variations in research6
(1)
(2)
information, farmer attitudes, and institutional commitment to information quality.  These
factors contribute to random deviations driving effectiveness ratings below the frontier. 
The empirical specification of the extension performance ratings by the i  farmer
th
i includes characteristics, experience, and human capital of the producers (x) who consult
i with the extension service.  Environmental factors and constraints (r) that influence
production patterns and the types of technical advice sought from the extension agents are
also included.  The resulting model is: 
We follow Atkinson and Primont in using a fixed-effects approach for
performance inefficiency variables which vary across the farmer-evaluators seeking
i extension advice, specified as : = 8!f.  Individual-specific variables that shift the
i performance efficiency of extension agents are identified by f with estimated parameters
8.  The frontier model is:  
i ii where u    = u - 8!f.   Performance efficiency measures are based on consistent estimators
*
i of the u from the distance function.  The negative of the residuals from equation 2 are
i i i ii ii calculated as 8!f. - < + u  = u - < which are consistent estimates of u - <.  These
^ ^ *^^
i estimates are then regressed on 8!f. yielding fitted values which are consistent estimates
i for the u. 7
The one-sided error term which represents technical inefficiency must be non-
ii negative.  This restriction implies u = min  ( u ), defining the estimate of the frontier
^^
i i intercept across all farms, so that u  =  u - u  $ 0.  Performance efficiency is estimated as
^* ^^
ii ii PE = exp( -u  ), where 0 < PE # 1, which is implicit in the normalization of u .
^* ^*
Data Description
The 1997 OFRF questionnaire was mailed to all U.S. certified organic farmers, based on
lists from certifying organizations.  Of the 1,192 surveys returned to the OFRF (26%
response rate), sufficient detail was provided in 569 responses to test the model.  A list of
12 personal information sources was provided for respondents to indicate both the
usefulness of and the number of contacts with each source (see Question 2.2, Walz, p.
38).  Although we focus on extension service ratings in this application, the cross-
sectional comparison of organizations needed for benchmarking (Smith and Goddard) is
implicit in the data, due to the question format.  
Summary data from the entire survey suggest that extension providers are
performing comparatively below the standards achieved by private sector providers of
organic production information.  Cooperative extension advisors were the 10  ranked
th
source of the 12 listed in the survey.  Only 18% of OFRF respondents gave extension
advisors the highest level rating (“very useful”).  Of all sources, extension advisors
received the highest percentage of  “never useful” ratings at 6%. 
Table 1 shows the variable descriptions and summary statistics for the dependent
and independent variables estimated for stochastic frontier model, as well as the question8
number from the OFRF survey matching each variable.  The dependent variable for the
performance evaluation model is ExtRate.  The extension rating was on an integer scale
of 1 to 4, 1 being "never useful" and 4 being "very useful.”  Only farmers who had at least
one contact with extension service providers were included in the analysis.  The mean
performance rating of extension advisors by these farmers was 2.66. 
The Independent Variables
Identifying the range of characteristics that could influence performance ratings requires
attention to farm structural, demographic, and management factors as well as farmer
attitudes about comparable information sources.  We focus on private sector competitors
since extension is most likely to lose clientele to this group if not responsive to
information needs (Boehlje and King).
Assessment of the quality of information received from extension sources is
related to the producer’s basic organic agriculture knowledge and congruity of the
information with that knowledge.  Time commitment to farming and experience with
organic farming are measures of the producer’s ability to assess and evaluate information. 
About 39% of our sample were part-time farmers (PartTime).  Experience in organic
farming (YrsOrg) averaged more than  9 years.  Experience is also squared (YrsOrgSq) to
account for possible nonlinear effects. 
 Producers are expected to have more familiarity with extension advisors if they 
previously used or currently use conventional production methods.  In contrast to organic
producers, conventional farmers consider extension service a reliable and useful source of9
information (Anderson et al.).  To account for this type of previous and current
experience with the extension service among organic producers, we combine two
dimensions of farmer experience - parallel farming and transitional farming.  Under the
U.S. regulation, farmers may certify as organic less acreage than they farm, leading to
parallel organic and conventional systems being managed by the same operator. 
Transition farmers were originally conventional producers but converted some or all of
their farms to organic production.  The subset of farmers who transitioned to organic
farming, and maintained mixed farming operations (TranMixd) accounts for 11% of our
sample.
A scale effect for farm size is expected to hold, in that larger farms have the most
incentive to use the technical information distributed by the extension service, which
usually offers at low cost the latest research-based, labor-saving technologies.  The mean
farm size (OrgAcre) was 144 acres.  Gross organic income (OrgInc) is included to test for
differences across income classes in extension ratings.  The mean of the income variable
was 4.27, implying that the average farm income from organic sales was between
$100,000 to $249,999. 
   Ratings of extension are expected to be lower if the service is perceived to be a
weak substitute for competing private sector information sources.  Boehlje and King
argued that extension’s role may evolve to a complementary rather than substitute
advisory service, incorporating such tasks as helping farmers assess the quality and value10
of private services or assisting farmers to effectively use the information that private
companies provide.  
To test whether private sources are substitutes or complements for extension in
the organic sector, a composite variable (PrivRate) of the usefulness ratings for four
private information sources was formed.  This variable was constructed by summing the
ratings (from 1 to 4) across four private sector sources - field consultants, other farmers,
organic certification agencies, and grower associations - producing an integer variable
ranging from 1 to 16.  A score of 4 indicated that all the private sources received the
lowest effectiveness rating while a score of 16 meant the maximum rating was given for
each.  The mean effectiveness rating for private information sources was 8.43. 
Correlations of the individual private sources with the index range from 0.43 to 0.65,
indicating that the index is not weighted unduly by any one component. 
Variation in institutional commitment to organic farming research affects the
quality and quantity of information available to use in responding to farmer queries. 
Fewer resources devoted to research and training are expected to lower extension ratings. 
Variation in institutional commitment across states has been documented by Sooby.  We
use the four USDA Sustainable Agriculture Research and Education (SARE) regions as
proxies for variation in institutional commitment, since SARE regions are the primary
geopolitical units for federal funding and inter-institutional collaboration in organic and
sustainable agriculture research.  Each region develops its own research priorities,
reviews proposals, awards grants, and administers the funding program.  In our sample, 11
36% of farmers were in SARE 1 region (West), 28% in SARE 2 region (NorCent), 8% in
SARE 3 region (South), and 28% in SARE 4 region (NorEast). 
Producer-specific Fixed Effects 
Two producer characteristics are relevant for the rating assigned to extension and affect
the ability of extension advisors to attain the highest possible rating, defined as the
i performance efficiency.  These characteristics, which compose the r elements in equation
2, influence the type of questions posed to extension and the satisfaction with the
responses to those questions.  These are fixed effects, exogenous to the extension service
provider.
  The first factor is the farmer’s current participation in on-farm research projects
with outside collaborators.  Farmers having more familiarity with the research process are
expected to demand a higher scientific standard for production advice offered by
extension agents, and to better understand scientific information presented by extension. 
A measure of the farmer’s research involvement (ResComt) was formed by recording the
number of resource categories, of seven possible choices (providing land, financial
support, labor, materials, or research advice, as well as publishing and distributing
research results), that the farmer provided in collaborative research.  In our sample, 75%
of farmers contributed no resources, while 12% provided all seven resources.  The mean
resource commitment was 1.5.
The second factor in performance efficiency is the severity of production
problems faced by the farmer.  We expect that more severe problems will be more12
difficult to solve, and will result in lower ratings of extension advisors.  The effect on
performance efficiency could be positive if extensionists are perceived to be making a
sincere effort to pull together as much information as they have, even if the information
itself is not adequate to address the problems.  An index of severity of production
problems (ProdProb) was constructed by summing the rating of severity from 1 to 5, with
5 being most serious, across five production problems - difficulties in achieving the
desired production level, finding organic inputs, costs of organic inputs, distance and
transport of organic inputs, and the effectiveness of organic inputs and methods.  The
index ranges from 5 to 25 so that a score of 25 means the maximum rating was given for
each production problem.  The mean value of the production problems index was 14.15
for the organic farmers in the sample.  There was no significant difference in ProdProb
across the income levels.
Estimation Results
Coefficient estimates and asymptotic t-statistics for the performance evaluation model are
given on table 2.  We used a linear specification of the model following Wooldridge, who
noted the robustness of the linear model to arbitrary forms of heteroscedasticity and serial
correlation.  By contrast, the ordered response model assumes that all conditional
moments of y given x are correctly specified and lacks the robustness of the linear
model.   
1
We tested for endogeneity of the ResComt and ProdProb variables in the
stochastic frontier.  Endogeneity tests using instruments which reflect the farmer’s13
choices of crop and management strategies, information sources and outlets used to
gather technical production and marketing information were performed.  The hypothesis
of weak exogeneity was not rejected as the calculated P  of 2.49 was less than the critical
2
2 value of P  of 5.99 at the 95% confidence level. 
2
The significant variables that positively affect farmer ratings of extension include
PartTime, TranMixd, and OrgInc.  Farmers who have less time to implement extension
advice, are more familiar with extension approaches, or are earning sufficient revenue to
supplement extension advice with private consultants are likely to be less critical of
university extension.  
PrivRate also has a significant positive effect on the performance ratings of
extension advisors, suggesting a complementary information provider role for extension. 
For each additional one-point increase in the index rating for the four private information
sources from the mean of 8, the rating for extension agents increases by 0.10.  This result
aligns with a principal-agent model that casts the farmer as a principal seeking production
advice from extension advisors and private information providers, who serve as the
agents (Levitt).  Using multiple information sources and agents provides the farmer-
principal the greatest chance of finding the “best” information, given the limited
availability of research-based information and the complexity of  ecosystem-dependent
production systems.
The significant positive estimate for West implies that extension advisors in the
region obtain 0.18 point higher ranking than the U.S. average rating, while the significant14
negative estimate for NorCent suggests a 0.14 point lower rating for agents in that region. 
Regional differences in resources allocated to the extension service do exist, with the
result that practices advocated by extension that could promote sustainable and organic
production have been unevenly adopted.  
When organic farmers face more serious production constraints, extension agents
receive lower performance ratings, as documented by the significant negative coefficient
estimate for ProdProb.  This result is consistent with the claim that difficult technical
questions from farmers lead to lower performance ratings. 
The West SARE region historically has made greater  commitments to organic
research and education. The West is home to the nation’s oldest organic farm and
certifying organizations, California Certified Organic Farmers and Oregon Tilth, which
have had more than 20 years to  to develop a research and education agenda and develop
positive relations with state and local extension advisors. California enacted the first state
law to define organic foods in 1982.  California and Washington were among the first
extension services to conduct outreach and applied research on organic agricultural
systems using teams of extensionists rather than individuals.  
Performance Efficiency 
 Table 3 shows the overall performance efficiency from the stochastic frontier model with
fixed effects and decomposes the two determinants that  influence the ratings. 
Performance efficiency is defined here as the effectiveness of extension agents in
achieving the maximum evaluations from their clientele conditioned on the farm level15
characteristics and environmental resources and constraints of the organic farmers.  The
mean performance efficiency measure is 0.923.  This suggests that extension agents are
not likely to earn much higher ratings from organic farmers in the absence of institutional
or structural changes in the organization. 
The model indicates that producer involvement in collaborative research
contributes to the performance efficiency of extension providers.  ResComt  is significant
and negative, indicating that farmer involvement in collaborative research projects
reduces the level of performance inefficiency as expected.  Lazear’s (1997) model of the
research decision demonstrated that more productive individuals are more likely to
initiate and become involved in research projects.  The results suggest that participation
in research is an indicator of the ability to successfully make use of  information from
extension agents, a result which aligns with Lazear’s (1997) model.  The mean
performance efficiency level of extension agents rated by producers who participate in
collaborative research was 0.946, compared with 0.916 for agents evaluated by
nonparticipating farmers.  The difference in the efficiency scores was statistically
significant at the 95% confidence level.
 More than 78%  of farmers involved in collaborative research have between four
and seven research partners.  We estimated separate models to examine whether the
efficiency-enhancing effects of research involvement are linked to the specific
collaborative partner.  Interaction terms indicating whether the research was initiated with
other farmers, university colleagues, private companies, or private research organizations16
were included in the specification.  None of these factors were significant in shifting the
performance efficiency measure.  These findings indicate that performance efficiency is
not linked to specific collaborative partners. 
 The model suggests that performance efficiency is enhanced when extension
agents are confronted with difficult production problems, as indicated by the statistically
significant negative coefficient for the inefficiency determinant.  The hypothesis that
observed effort to address more complicated problems is rewarded in ratings is supported.
We decomposed the severity determinant into high severity, which are farms with
an index that exceeded the mean value of ProdProb by more than one standard deviation,
and low severity, which are farms with an index  below the mean index value by one
standard deviation.  Extension service personnel who provide assistance to producers
with severe constraints achieved performance efficiency ratings of 0.958, statistically
higher than the rating of 0.883 for extension experts serving farmers with less severe
production problems. 
Benchmarking Extension Performance 
Organizational performance evaluation is designed to identify ways that employees can
improve their performance and to guide changes in institutional goals and programs.   
Lovell noted that overall performance may be most readily improved by focusing on the
laggards or poor performers and linking them to role models or leaders to follow.  Any
factors that influence farmer-evaluations of the two groups may be benchmarked to serve
as a basis for performance evaluation.17
We defined laggards as extension advisors whose performance efficiency scores
fell below 0.900, while leaders were defined as those whose scores exceeded 0.950. 
Explanatory variables from the group of 119 laggards and 94 leaders were compared to
identify relevant benchmark factors that distinguish the two groups.
The key factor differentiating leaders and laggards was the farmer resource
commitment variable (ResComt).  The leaders interacted more with farmers who were 
involved in collaborate research than did the laggards, 78 percent compared with six
percent.  Clients consulting with the leaders were involved in an average of four research
roles compared to less than one role for farmers who worked with the laggards.
From a manager’s perspective, the results of this comparison and those in the
preceding sections clarify several points related to organizational and individual agent
evaluations.  First, the quality and availability of information are insufficient to meet the
needs of extension agents interacting with organic farmers.  Although the average
performance efficiency is 0.923, meaning agents are relatively close to the ratings
frontier, the average rating is only 2.66 on a four-point scale.  Farmers give agents credit
for attempting to answer complex organic production questions, as shown by the
efficiency gain associated with ProdProb, but express dissatisfaction with the results in
their lower ratings of agents.  The only way to significantly increase the average rating of
extension agents by organic farmers is to move more agents toward the frontier, which
will entail institutional and/or structural changes.  These findings are consistent with18
Kalirajan and Shand’s suggestion that a main constraint in achieving technical efficiency
in agricultural production is the lack of information on best practice techniques. 
The estimated coefficients for the ResComt variable offer a clue as to how such
change may be accomplished.  As farmers become more involved in collaborative
research, they are better able to utilize information provided by extension, even it is not a
complete answer to a problem.  Extensionists in the West region often become research
partners with organic farmers, and tend to receive better institutional support for these
activities.  Expanding this emphasis in other regions could improve readiness of
extension agents to address complicated environmental-agricultural problems, and
improve ratings of extension advisors by organic farmers.
Mechanisms are already in place to support this change.  The USDA’s SARE
program offers structural and financial support for regional research priorities, usually
with requirements that outreach be a main component of funded research.  The SARE
Professional Development Program is designed to support on-farm research by farmers in
collaboration with university extension and research personnel and to train extensionists
in sustainable agriculture methods.  
Conclusions
This study benchmarks the nonmanagerial factors that influence external performance
ratings of  university extension by organic farmers.  By identifying these contingent
factors, we can test claims about the reasons for relatively low ratings by this sector.  We
show that extension agents are rated higher by farmers who have less time to implement19
extension advice, are more familiar with extension approaches, or are earning sufficient
revenue to supplement extension advice with private consultants.  Farmers in the West
SARE region are more likely to approve of extension advice.  
These results suggest that organic farmers may express systematic  bias unrelated
to actual performance in their ratings of  extension agents.  Farmers facing more severe
production constraints are likely to rate extension lower, supporting the assertion that
more complicated questions bias external ratings.  Managers should account for these
sources of potential bias when assessing individual performance of extension agents who
deal with organic farmers.  Additionally, the evolving complementary role of extension
with respect to private information sources in the organic sector should be explicitly
recognized.  Managers should not penalize extension agents who offer interpretations of
private sector information rather than attempting to compete with  farmers, consultants,
periodicals, and conferences that specialize in organic information delivery.  
From a programmatic perspective, greater investment in agent training and more
emphasis on university-farmer research collaboration will improve performance ratings
and performance efficiency.  Extension agents who lead in efficiency ratings should
document their approaches and assist in training the laggards in effective methods.  
 Performance efficiency is enhanced when extension agents are confronted with
difficult production problems, but ratings will only improve if institutional change
through increased research and training is implemented. 20
Footnotes 
1. In the ordered response model, the main focus of attention is on the response
probabilities such as the probability that the extension providers achieve rating of
“very useful.”  The expected outcome or rating provided by the organic farmers is
not focus of the ordered response model.  The linear model does provide a clear
and readily interpreted indicator of performance inefficiency and is preferred in
this context.  Wooldridge noted the predicted response from the ordered response
model is not an interesting outcome as the underlying measure is typically an
abstract measure.  In addition, coefficients from ordered response models are
often of limited interest.  We did estimate an ordered probit model and the results,
which align exactly with those reported here, are available. 21
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Table 1.  Variable Descriptions and Summary Statistics
Standard Survey 
Variable Description  Mean Deviation Question
a
ExtRate Farmer rating of extension advisor usefulness  2.66 0.84 2.2A
Share of farmers across rating categories  
1   Never useful  0.06 
2   Sometimes useful  0.40 
3   Useful  0.36 
4   Very useful  0.18 
PartTime  Operator is part-time farmer, 1 if yes  0.37 0.48 8.3
YrsOrg Years as an organic farmer, from 0 to 45 years 9.63 7.19 8.10
TranMixd   Farmer originally a conventional producer, now
farms organic and conventional acres, 1 if yes  0.11 0.32 6.1, 8.1
OrgAcre Acreage farmed organically, 
from 0.125 to 6,000 acres 144.62 414.14 8.6A
OrgInc  Total gross organic farming income,
integer variables for 5 categories 4.27 2.10 8.8
Share of all farmers by income category
1   if  less than $5,000 0.24
2   if  $5,000 to $14,999 0.22
3   if $15,000 to $99,999 0.36
4   if  $100,000 to $249,999 0.10
5   if at least $250,000 0.08
PrivRate Effectiveness rating for private sources, 
rating (1 to 4) multiplied by number used
(1 to 4), from 1 to 16 8.43 2.97 2.2A
ResComt  Resources provided for research efforts  1.51 2.67 2.5
(0 to 7 resources)
ProdProb  Index of organic production problems  14.15 5.18 6.3
rating of 5 problems (1 to 5) multiplied 24
by severity (1 to 5), from 1 to 25
West Farm is in SARE Region 1, 1 if yes 0.36 0.48 8.12
NorCent Farm is in SARE Region 2, 1 if yes 0.28 0.45 8.12
South Farm is in SARE Region 3, 1 if yes 0.08 0.27 8.12
NorEast Farm is in SARE Region 4, 1 if yes 0.28 0.45 8.12
 The question number in Walz corresponding to each variable.  Descriptive statistics
a
based on 569 observations.25







YrsOrg*YrsOrg 0.0006   1.322
OrgAcre -0.00001 -0.157
OrgInc 0.075*   2.143
PrivRate 0.027*   2.302
ResComt   0.0009  0.062
ProdProb -0.013* -1.974
West 0.182*  3.457
NorCent -0.143* -3.612
South   0.026  0.197
NorEast 0.076  1.130
Inefficiency Determinants 
ResComt -0.006 -1.730
ProdProb   -0.005* -2.492
 Asterisk indicates asymptotic t-values with significance at " = 0.05 level.  Model
a
estimated with 569 observations. 26
Table 3.  Performance Efficiency Ratings and Decompositions 
Standard
Observations Mean Deviation Minimum Maximum
Overall Efficiency 569 0.923 0.027 0.876 1.000
By Involvement in On-Farm Research 
Positive Involvement  156 0.946  0.026 0.888 1.000
a
No Involvement   413 0.916 0.022 0.878 0.962
By Severity of Production Problems  
b
Producers with High Severity   95 0.958    0.018  0.940  1.000 
a
Producer with Low Severity   70 0.883  0.005  0.878  0.898 
 Within category comparison is statistically different at the 0.05 significance level.
a
 The five production problems are difficulties related to achieving the desired production
b
level,  finding organic inputs, costs of organic inputs, distance and transport of organic
inputs, and the effectiveness of organic inputs and methods.  High severity is when the
observed index exceeds the mean by one standard deviation.  Low severity  occurs when
the observed index is below the mean by one standard deviation. 